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Little is known about the potentially powerful set of emotion regulation (ER) processes
that target emotion-eliciting situations. We thus studied the decision to end emotion-
eliciting situations in the laboratory. We hypothesized that people would try to end
negative situations more frequently than neutral situations to regulate distress. In addition,
motivated by the selection, optimization, and compensation with ER framework, we
hypothesized that failed attempts to end the situation would prompt either (a) greater
negative emotion or (b) compensatory use of a different ERprocess, attentional deployment
(AD). Fifty-eight participants (18–26 years old, 67% women) viewed negative and neutral
pictures and pressed a key whenever they wished to stop viewing them. After key press,
the picture disappeared (“success”) or stayed (“failure”) on screen. To index emotion,
we measured corrugator and electrodermal activity, heart rate, and self-reported arousal.
To index overt AD, we measured eye gaze. As their reason for ending the situation,
participants more frequently reported being upset by high- than low-arousal negative
pictures; they more frequently reported being bored by low- than high-arousal neutral
pictures. Nevertheless, participants’ negative emotional responding did not increase in
the context of ER failure nor did they use overt AD as a compensatory ER strategy. We
conclude that situation-targeted ER processes are used to regulate emotional responses
to high-arousal negative and low-arousal neutral situations; ER processes other than overt
AD may be used to compensate for ER failure in this context.
Keywords: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, process model, emotion regulation,
SOC-ERpt
INTRODUCTION
Emotional responses are often useful in our everyday life, but can,
depending on the context, be inappropriate. Imagine being sick
in a hospital, undergoing an unpleasant medical procedure that
is your only option to get healthy again. As a response to this
situation, you might feel afraid, your heart might start racing, and
you might have the urge to leave the room. However, in order
to meet your goal for this situation (getting healthy), you reduce
your distress during the procedure by staying in the room, taking
a couple of deep breaths, distracting yourself by counting ﬂoor
tiles, reminding yourself that the outcome is worth it, holding the
hand of your signiﬁcant other, or all of the above. This is just an
illustration of when and how we routinely regulate our emotions
based on the context we are in (Gross et al., 2006).
As the example above may suggest, there are many ways in
which we can regulate our emotions. One particularly useful and
inﬂuential framework for organizing these many ways of regulat-
ing our emotions is the process model of emotion regulation (ER;
Gross, 1998). According to thismodel, ﬁve families of ER processes
each target oneof four components of the emotion generative cycle
(Gross and Thompson, 2007), the situation, attention to the situa-
tion, appraisals of the situation, or the multisystem response. That
is to say, we can select the situations we put ourselves in based on
the emotions we anticipate experiencing (“situation selection”).
Once in a situation, we can modify that situation to alter our
emotional experience (“situation modiﬁcation”). These two ER
families target the situation component of the emotion generative
cycle. We can attend to different aspects of the situation (“atten-
tional deployment”), reappraise it (i.e., generate a new meaning;
“cognitive change”), and/or ﬁnally, directly alter our experiential,
expressive, or bodily response to the situation (“response modula-
tion”). The latter three ER families target the attention, appraisal,
and multisystem response components of the emotion generative
cycle, respectively.
Much has been learned about the frequency and success with
which attentional deployment, cognitive change (particularly cog-
nitive reappraisal, CR), and response modulation (particularly
expressive suppression) are used. On the frequency side, when
asked to describe episodes of ER usage in the preceding 2 weeks,
participants frequently report using attentional deployment (in
39% of the episodes), cognitive change (in 33% of the episodes,
most of whichwere instances of CR), and responsemodulation (in
53% of the episodes, most of which were instances of expressive
suppression; Gross et al., 2006). In addition, in a performance-
based laboratory task designed by Jackson et al. (2000), 56%
of participants reported using cognitive ER strategies and 40%
reported using attentional deployment when asked to decrease
their emotional responses to negative pictures. On the success
side, attentional deployment, CR, and expressive suppression have
all been shown to be effective in altering emotion in accordance
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with the regulatory goal (e.g., Gross and Levenson, 1993; Urry,
2010; see Webb et al., 2012, for a recent meta-analysis). More-
over, as reviewed by Gross et al. (2006), CR is effectively used
to decrease unpleasant emotional experiences without signiﬁcant
interpersonal, cognitive, and physiological costs. Expressive sup-
pression, by contrast, is effective in down-regulating expressive
behavior, but has little effect on experience of unpleasant emo-
tions. In fact, more frequent usage of expressive suppression has
been linked to decreased well-being, emotional and social func-
tioning (Badcock et al., 2011; Gross et al., 2006), at least inWestern
cultures.
In contrast to the families of ER described above, to our knowl-
edge less is currently known about the frequency and success of
situation selection and situationmodiﬁcation, at least with respect
to their coverage in the ER literature. In fact, there are so few stud-
ies available that these two families of ER were not included in
Webb et al. (2012) meta-analysis. That being said, substantial evi-
dence about goal-oriented approach-avoidance behavior comes
from the literature on coping. In this literature, approach strate-
gies include actively thinking about the situation in different ways
while avoidant strategies include denial of threat and getting away
from the unpleasant situation (Ebata and Moos, 1991).
In their review, Mullen and Suls (1982) found that avoidant
strategies are generally effective short-term solutions, while
approach strategies are more beneﬁcial for long-term goals. For
instance, one can easily appreciate that avoiding certain situations,
such as going to a party or giving a speech in public, will be useful
in the short-term if it prevents acute anxiety. However, this sort of
avoidance may be detrimental in the long-term if it prevents one
from habituating to the situation and learning that the worst-case
scenario usually does not happen (e.g., youwill not be ostracized at
the party or booed off stage during the speech; Campbell-Sills and
Barlow, 2007). Subsequently, avoidant strategies have been shown
to be useful for reducing stress and preventing overwhelming anx-
iety, while approach strategies have been shown to facilitate taking
appropriate action and assuming more control over the situation
(Roth and Cohen, 1986).
While approach and avoidance strategies have been shown to
be beneﬁcial, research suggests that there can be costs associated
with using both. For example, approaching the situation in which
there is little room for change can lead to increased distress and
worry (Roth and Cohen, 1986). Moreover, clinical evidence sug-
gests that using avoidance strategies chronically or inﬂexibly can
maintain psychopathology, as is the case in avoidant personality
disorder and social anxiety disorders (Campbell-Sills and Barlow,
2007). Additionally, usage of avoidant strategies has been linked to
depression (Herman-Stabl et al., 1995). Overall, it seems that ben-
eﬁts and costs linked with avoidance and approach are dependent
on the context in which they are used.
It is important to note that in the coping literature, approach
and avoidance strategies are deﬁned in ways that conﬂate the ER
processes involved. For example, viewed from within the process
model of ER, avoidance coping involves both situation selection
(getting away from the unpleasant situation) and cognitive change
(denial of threat; Ebata and Moos, 1991). And yet, these families
of ER are rather different. Situation selection, according to the
process model of ER, refers to behavioral strategies people can
use to put themselves into (or take themselves out of) particular
situations. This is distinct from cognitive change, which refers
only to as the cognitive act of appraising situations differently.
While it makes good sense to consider these strategies, which may
regularly go hand in hand in daily life, together, it may also be
scientiﬁcally useful to isolate strategies that target the situation
component of the emotion generative cycle (situation selection,
situation modiﬁcation) from strategies that target the appraisal
component (cognitive change).
Studies reviewed above seem to indicate that situation-targeted
ER strategies have potentially powerful effects, yet they have not
been extensively studied within the context of the process model
of ER. There have been some efforts in this direction, of course.
For example, Gross et al. (2006) conducted semi-structured inter-
views about daily experiences of ER. These interviews revealed
that people do not report using situation selection/modiﬁcation
often. However, while this study represented an important step
and interview data are very informative, they are limited to telling
us about the strategies people are aware of and/or willing to report
using. Considering the limitations of retrospective self-report, it
is possible that the actual frequency with which people use cer-
tain ER strategies could be different. For example, people may be
unaware that they chose to enter certain situations because of how
those situations were expected to make them feel or simply not
remember the situations they chose not to enter. Because of this,
it is important to examine situation-targeted ER strategies using
other methods as well.
One example of an objectivemethod of examining these strate-
gies is reﬂected in the pioneering effort of Rovenpor et al. (2013).
These authors developed the Affective Environment task to mea-
sure situation selection. In this task, participants spent several
minutes in a room in which there were opportunities to engage
with valenced stimuli, consisting of websites, television news sto-
ries, and hard-copy articles. Using this task, Rovenpor et al. (2013)
found that older adults with ER self-efﬁcacy and general control
beliefs chose to engage with fewer negative stimuli, while their
younger adult counterparts chose to engage with more negative
stimuli. These results suggest that people select situations as a func-
tionof the emotional potential of those situations and this choice is
moderated by individual differences (e.g., age, self-efﬁcacy, control
beliefs).
The reasonable assumption of the above ﬁndings is that peo-
ple approach or avoid negative situations in part because of how
unpleasant those situations are likely to be. Of course, feeling
negative is not the only feeling that is likely to motivate situa-
tion selection. A positive feeling such as interest can also motivate
situation-targeted strategies. Lang et al. (1993) designed a task
in which participants viewed and rated negative, neutral, and
positive pictures. After completing questionnaires, participants
viewed these pictures again along with a set of new pictures to
facilitate recognition memory testing. Importantly, after making
their recognition decision, participants had the option to press a
key to make the pictures disappear from the screen. The authors
showed that longer picture viewing time was positively correlated
with greater ratings of interest, meaning that people tended to
look longer at interesting stimuli. Thinking of viewing time as
an indicator of situation selection (i.e., participants remained in
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interesting situations longer), these results suggest that interest (or
the lack thereof, also known as boredom) may also motivate the
decision to use situation-targeted ER strategies.
The selection, optimization, and compensation with emo-
tion regulation (SOC-ER) framework suggests that we select and
optimize ER strategies, and if they are not successful, we might
compensate by employing other ER strategies (Urry and Gross,
2010; Opitz et al., 2012). Imagine again that you’re in the hospital,
about to undergo that unpleasant medical procedure, but before
you do, the nurse has to draw your blood. You were not aware of
this, and you start getting nervous. You try to end this situation
(and thus your distress) by asking the nurse to draw the blood
later (situation selection/modiﬁcation). The nurse responds that
she needs to do it right now, per doctor’s orders. So, while she
draws your blood, you look away from the needle to the ﬂowers in
your hospital room (attentional deployment) in order to reduce
your distress. As illustrated in this example, when your attempt to
end the situation (attempting to postpone the blood draw) failed
to regulate your negative emotions, you tried to compensate for
this failure using attentional deployment instead (looking at the
ﬂowers).
Consistent with the idea of compensation, there is evidence
suggesting that people use multiple ER strategies, perhaps tomake
themselves feel better. For instance, Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema
(2013) found that 65% of participants reported using two ormore
ER strategies while watching a short disgust-eliciting video clip.
In addition, Wolgast et al. (2011) provided evidence suggesting
that people who failed to reduce negative emotional experiences
using CR turned to avoidance, while people who used accep-
tance turned to avoidance less. In their experiment examining
CR to increase and decrease the negative emotions triggered by
pictures, van Reekum et al. (2007) demonstrated via eye tracking
that participants deployed their attention toward and away from
emotion-triggering information in the pictures and that the extent
to which they did so explained signiﬁcant variance in reappraisal-
related neural activation. More recently, Bebko et al. (2011) found
that attentional deployment is used in the context of both CR and
expressive suppression, further indicating that ER strategies are
employed concurrently. Collectively, these examples hint that peo-
ple use multiple strategies to regulate their emotions and, possibly,
that they do so in part to compensate for ER failure. However, this
conclusion is speculative. Needed are studies that provide empir-
ical conﬁrmation using methods that directly assess the extent to
which people use alternative ER strategies when their original ER
strategies fail to have the intended effect.
In sum, there is empirical and clinical evidence suggesting
that situation-targeted ER strategies are used in everyday life
and that inappropriate usage of these strategies has been linked
to behavioral and mental disorders. Furthermore, there is evi-
dence suggesting that people tend to use multiple ER strategies to
improve their emotional experience, which might in part reﬂect
the attempt to compensate for unsuccessful ER outcomes. It is
still unclear how often people actually use situation-targeted ER
strategies, and under which conditions they choose to do so. It
is also unclear what happens when situation-targeted ER strate-
gies fail to have the intended effect on our emotions. Answering
these questions will lead us to a more complete understanding
of the complex mechanisms proposed in the process model and
the SOC-ER framework. Furthermore, understanding the con-
texts in which situation-targeted ER strategies are used and with
what degree of success will help inform treatments for the behav-
ioral and mental disorders linked to maladaptive usage of these
strategies.
The purpose of the present studywas to assess howoften people
choose to end negative situations if given the opportunity, as well
as their stated reasons for doing so. In addition, we sought to
determine whether people engage in compensatory ER strategies
when attempts to end these situations fail. To address these issues,
participants viewed a set of negative and neutral pictures, andwere
told that they could press a button if they wished to stop looking at
the picture. On half of those trials, the button press succeeded; the
picture was replaced by a blank screen for the remaining picture
presentation time. On the other half of those trials, the button
press failed; the picture remained on screen for the remaining
picture presentation time.We thusmanipulated outcome: whether
or not the attempt to end the situation was a success or failure
on trials in which participants pressed the button. We collected
the percentage of button presses and reaction time (RT) to press
the button to index the frequency and rapidity of attempts to
end the situation, respectively. We also recorded eye gaze data
using eye tracking to index overt attentional deployment, and self-
report arousal ratings, corrugator activity, heart rate (HR), and
skin conductance to index emotional responding.
We hypothesized that, in order to regulate their emotional
response, peoplewould attempt to end the situation (press the but-
ton) more often and faster on negative trials than on neutral trials
(Hypothesis 1). We further hypothesized that they would report
doing so because of distress more so in the negative than in the
neutral condition (Hypothesis 2). Pursuant to deciding to end the
situation, we also hypothesized that one of two alternatives might
be observed. On the one hand, for the negative condition more so
than the neutral condition, people may experience more negative
emotion in the failure condition relative to the success condition,
as reﬂected in self report and changes in physiology (Hypothe-
sis 3a). On the other hand, they may compensate by engaging
in other ER strategies. In this case, negative emotion would be
similar in the success and failure conditions, but there would be
greater compensatory ER (i.e., looking away from emotional con-
tent in the pictures) in the failure condition relative to the success
condition (Hypothesis 3b). For this compensatory hypothesis, we
focused speciﬁcally on attentional deployment as reﬂected in eye
tracking. Attention is a particularly important component of ER
processes (Wadlinger and Isaacowitz, 2011). In addition, in this
picture-viewing context, looking away from the emotional content
of the pictures has been demonstrated to occur in studies exam-
ining other forms of ER (van Reekum et al., 2007; Bebko et al.,
2011). Attentional deployment would, thus, be one obvious and
potentially common alternative ER strategy when one’s attempt to
end the situation fails.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty-two Tufts undergraduates participated in the study. 41
of these participated in exchange for course credit. 21
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were recruited though advertisements posted on the internet
(http://www.tuftslife.com) and received $10 per hour as compen-
sation. Because we anticipated some loss of data due to equipment
problems, artifacts, and extreme ormissing values, this sample size
was determined with the goal to have approximately 50 useable
observations in hypothesis testing. The data for one participant
were removed from analyses because the participant misunder-
stood the task. Another participant was inattentive to the task
and talkative and skipped many trials. Eye tracking data were
not available for two additional participants due to equipment
failure.
Fifty-eight participants were included in our ﬁnal sample. Of
these, 39 participants were female (67%), 34 wereWhite (59%), 10
were Asian (17%), 9 were African American (16%), 1 was Native
Hawaiian (2%), and 3 were multiracial (4%), and one person did
not wish to disclose this information (2%); 5 of our participants
considered themselves to be of Hispanic or Latino origin (8.6%).
The age range was from 18 to 26 years (M = 19.36 years, SD = 1.53
years). All procedureswere approved by the Social, Behavioral, and
Educational Research Institutional Review Board at Tufts Uni-
versity. Participants provided written informed consent before
participating.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURES
Stimuli
Participants viewed a set of digital color pictures (800 pix-
els × 600 pixels) selected from the International Affective Picture
System (Lang et al., 2008). We selected 30 negative pictures on
the basis of normative data across men and women to be highly
unpleasant (M = 2.69, SD = 0.72, on a scale ranging from 1 to
9 where 9 is completely happy), and highly arousing (M = 5.61,
SD = 0.96, on a scale ranging from 1 to 9 where 9 = completely
aroused). In addition, we selected 30 neutral pictures to be neither
pleasant nor unpleasant (M = 5.23, SD = 0.41), and low in arousal
(M = 3.51, SD = 0.54)1.
Picture task
Participants viewed the above set of 60 pictures, evenly distributed
across two blocks. The order in which the 60 pictures were pre-
sented was randomized for each participant. Participants were
told in advance that they could press the space bar whenever
they wished to stop looking at a picture. They were further told
that sometimes the picture would go away when they pressed the
button (success trials) and sometimes it would remain on screen
(failure trials); they were not told that there would be a roughly
50:50 ratio of success to failure trials. The picture task was pre-
sented using E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh,
PA, USA).
The trial structure for the picture task is presented in Figure 1.
All trials began with a white ﬁxation cross presented in the center
of a black screen for 1 s. This was followed by the presentation
1The following pictures from the International Affective Picture System (Lang et al.,
2008) set, listed by catalog number, were used: negative – 2301, 2312, 2590, 2661,
2683, 2710, 2718, 2795, 3001, 3016, 3060, 3195, 3212, 3280, 3500, 3530, 6315, 6570.1,
6825, 8230, 8231, 8485, 9046, 9075, 9220, 9252, 9254, 9265, and 9419; neutral – 2026,
2036, 2101, 2102, 2104, 2107, 2190, 2191, 2200, 2235, 2359, 2377, 2382, 2383, 2393,
2396, 2397, 2411, 2512, 2521, 2575, 2593, 2595, 2597, 2745.1, 2870, 7493, 7496,
7550, and 7632.
of a picture for up to a total of 12 s. If participants chose not to
press the space bar, the picture would stay on the screen for the
entire 12 s. If participants pressed the space bar, the picture was
randomly assigned to either (1) leave the screen and be replaced
with black screen until a total of 12 s had elapsed (success condi-
tion; approximately 50% of the press trials) or (2) remain on the
screen until a total of 12 s had elapsed (failure condition; approxi-
mately 50% of the press trials). After 12 s had elapsed, participants
were cued to select one of three reasons for pressing (upset, bored,
other) or not pressing (interested, indifferent, other) the space bar
(see Figure 1). The choice of these answer options was motivated
by literature reviewed above, suggesting that people regulate their
emotions when feeling distressed (e.g., Gross et al., 2006) and that
viewing time might be related to boredom/interest in the picture
(Lang et al., 1993). The option other was included so that partic-
ipants did not have a sense of forced choice, and thus could note
that they chose to end or not end picture presentation for rea-
sons we did not anticipate based on previous research. This screen
remained present until a response was recorded, at which point,
participants were asked to provide an arousal rating on a scale
ranging from 1 (mildly arousing) to 9 (highly arousing), indicat-
ing how the picture made them feel. The rating screen remained
present until a response was recorded. Lastly, participants saw a
black screen with a central white ellipsis that lasted 2 s to provide
a brief break between trials.
Pretesting
We conducted pretesting of the picture task and stimuli with a
separate sample of 15Tufts undergraduates. The goals of pretesting
were to (1) determine the ideal picture presentation duration and
(2) identify areas of interest (AOIs) in each picture for subsequent
analyses of the eye tracking data in the present study.
On the basis of pretesting, we selected 12 s as the picture dura-
tion because this duration when compared to three others (6, 8,
10 s) came closest to yielding a button press percentage of roughly
67%, enough to yield an approximately even number of pictures in
the no-press, press-success, and press-failure cells of the design. In
addition, when presented for 12 s, participants indicated that they
pressed the space bar to terminate presentation of negative pic-
tures most frequently because they were upset and least frequently
because they were bored in comparison to other trial lengths. This
suggested that button pressing in the 12-s context was more likely
than in the context of other trial lengths to bemotivated by a desire
to regulate negative emotions, our key construct of interest.
Also in pretesting (using the subset of 13 participants for whom
eye tracking data were available), we identiﬁed AOIs based on
eye gaze ﬁxations observed within the ﬁrst 750 ms of picture
presentation. Since all space bar presses occurred after 750 ms
of presentation, the AOIs we identiﬁed captured spontaneous
deployment of attention as opposed to attentional processes that
were driven by the attempt to end the situation. The AOIs were
polygon-shaped, and their sizes varied from one picture to the
next. Up to three AOIs were retained for each picture, all of
which had to meet the criterion of being based on at least 60%
of the participants. There was no signiﬁcant difference in the size
of AOIs for negative (M = 5.13, SD = 2.67) compared to neu-
tral (M = 4.60, SD = 2.60) pictures, t(58) = 0.78, p = 0.440,
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FIGURE 1 |Trial structure for the picture task. Note that when they
pressed the space bar, participants were offered the following full-sentence
reasons: “I was upset by the picture,” “I was bored by the picture” and
“Other.” If they did not press the space bar, they were offered the following
reasons: “I was interested in the picture,” “I was indifferent to the picture”
and “Other.” These full descriptions are not presented in the ﬁgure proper
due to space constraints; instead we use the terms “upset,” “bored,”
“interested,” “indifferent,” and “other.” While we used IAPS pictures for this
task, the example picture in this ﬁgure is from one of the author’s private
collection.
dz = 0.20 where AOI size was deﬁned as the percentage of the
picture area the AOI occupies. Visual inspection indicated that the
AOIs generally reﬂected primary features of the scenes mostly in
the center of the screen and captured all of the information in each
picture that we judged to be either negative or neutral (as appro-
priate in light of normative ratings for these two categories of
stimuli).
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
In addition to subjective ratings of arousal, peripheral physiologi-
cal data (corrugator activity, electrocardiography, and electroder-
mal activity) were collected continuously during the task using an
MP150 system (Biopac, Goleta, CA, USA). These data were pro-
cessed ofﬂine using ANSLAB (Wilhelm and Peyk, 2005). Bilateral
eye-tracking data were also unobtrusively collected using a Tobii
T120 Eye Tracker (Danderyd, Sweden; sampled at 60 Hz). These
datawere processed ofﬂine usingTobii Studio software. The details
of these recordings and howwe computed our dependent variables
of interest are described below.
Button pressing behavior
Thepercentageof trials onwhichparticipants pressed the spacebar
was calculated within the negative and neutral picture categories.
This score represented the frequency with which participants
elected to end the situation. In addition, we calculated mean
response time on trials on which the button was pressed within
the negative and neutral picture categories. This score represented
the speed with which participants elected to end the situation.
Ratings of arousal
Ratings of arousal were used to index subjective emotional expe-
rience. These values were averaged across trials separately for
no-press, press-success, and press-failure conditions within the
negative and neutral picture categories for each participant.
Corrugator electromyography
Corrugator electromyography was selected as an index of facial
expressive behavior, even that which is not overtly observable. It
has been shown to be sensitive to stimulus valence, exhibiting
greater activity in response to negative stimuli and lower activity
in response to pleasant stimuli (Bradley and Lang, 2007). Two
4 mm Ag/AgCl electrodes were placed in bipolar conﬁguration
over the left eye per Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). Corrugator
electromyography was sampled at 1000 Hz and bandpass-ﬁltered
online (5 Hz to 3 kHz; 60 Hz notch ﬁlter on). Ofﬂine, data were
resampled to 400 Hz, rectiﬁed and smoothed with a 16-Hz low-
pass ﬁlter, decimated to 4 Hz, and smoothed with a 1-s prior
moving average ﬁlter.
Baseline-corrected corrugator activity was calculated for each
250ms time bin after picture onset by subtracting the 250ms time
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bin immediately preceding picture onset for each trial for each
participant. After baseline correction, thedata for this 12-swindow
of interest were averaged across time bins and trials separately for
no-press, pre-press-success, post-press-success, pre-press-failure,
and post-press-failure conditions within the negative and neutral
picture categories for each participant. Separating pre-press from
post-press values allowed us to assess for change in corrugator
activity as a function of the attempt to end the situation by pressing
the button.
Electrocardiography
Electrocardiography was used to measure HR, which is dually
innervated by the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of
the autonomic nervous system. In event-related paradigms involv-
ing passive viewing of negative pictures, HR exhibits an initial,
parasympathetically mediated deceleration (Bradley and Lang,
2007). Two disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes pregelled with 7% chlo-
ride gel (1 cm circular contact area) were placed under the left
and right collarbones on the chest after swabbing with an alco-
hol or an electrode prep pad. ECG was acquired continuously at
1,000 Hz. Ofﬂine, the ECG signal was downsampled to 400 Hz
and bandpass-ﬁltered from 0.5 to 40 Hz.
Interbeat interval series were created by identifying R-spikes
using automated ANSLAB algorithms. R-spikes that were not
detected automatically, thus leading to an erroneously long period
between successive R-spikes, were marked for inclusion by hand.
Similarly, R-spikes that were identiﬁed incorrectly, thus leading
to an erroneously short period between successive R-spikes, were
removed by hand. Following such artifact correction, the inter-
beat interval series was converted to HR in beats per minute. HR
data were decimated to 10 Hz and then smoothed with a 1-s prior
moving average ﬁlter.
Baseline-corrected HR was calculated for each 100-ms time
bin following picture onset by subtracting the 100-ms time bin
immediately preceding picture onset for each trial for each par-
ticipant. After baseline correction, the data for this 12-s window
of interest were averaged across time bins and trials separately for
no-press, pre-press-success, post-press-success, pre-press-failure,
and post-press-failure conditions within the negative and neu-
tral picture categories for each participant. Separating pre-press
from post-press values allowed us to assess for change in HR as
a function of the attempt to end the situation by pressing the
button.
Electrodermal activity
Electrodermal activity (EDA) was selected as a pure measure of
sympathetic activation of the autonomic nervous system. Two
disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes pregelled with 0.5% chloride iso-
tonic gel (1 cm circular contact area) were attached to the distal
phalanges of the index and middle ﬁngers on the left hand. EDA
level was recorded with DC coupling and constant voltage elec-
trode excitation at 31.25 Hz (sensitivity = 0.7 nS). Ofﬂine, EDA
was smoothedwith a 1Hz, low-pass ﬁlter, decimated to 10Hz, and
linearly detrended on a trial-by-trial basis. One ground electrode
for all physiological channels was placed on the forehead.
Baseline-corrected EDA was calculated for each 100-ms time
bin following picture onset by subtracting the 100-ms time bin
immediately preceding picture onset for each trial for each par-
ticipant. After baseline correction, the data for this 12-s window
of interest were averaged across time bins and trials separately for
no-press, pre-press-success, post-press-success, pre-press-failure,
and post-press-failure conditions within the negative and neu-
tral picture categories for each participant. Separating pre-press
from post-press values allowed us to assess for change in EDA
as a function of the attempt to end the situation by pressing the
button.
Eye tracking
Eye tracking was used to measure overt deployment of attention
to key information in the pictures. This was operationalized as
the amount of time participants spent looking within the pretest-
deﬁned AOIs for each picture relative to total viewing time on a
second-by-second basis.
Fixations within the AOI were identiﬁed using the “Tobii ﬁxa-
tion ﬁlter” algorithm, proposed by Olsson (2007). The algorithm
uses eye tracker sample rate (60 Hz in our case) and the distance
between neighboring gaze data points to calculate changes in the
eye movement velocity for all eye movement samples. If the veloc-
ity is below 0.42 pixels/ms, the raw data points are assigned to the
same ﬁxation, but if it is above this threshold, they are assigned
to a new ﬁxation. To determine the location of the ﬁxation, the
algorithm uses the mean of the coordinates from the raw data
points belonging to the same ﬁxation (Tobii Technology, 2010,
p. 78).
Fixation data for the 12-s window of interest were averaged
across time and trials separately for no-press, pre-press-success,
post-press-success, pre-press-failure, and post-press-failure con-
ditions within the negative and neutral picture categories for each
participant. Separating pre-press from post-press values allowed
us to assess for change in looking time as a function of the attempt
to end the situation by pressing the button.
POST-TASK QUESTIONNAIRES
At the end of the study session, participants completed self-report
questionnaires assessing exposure to stressors (Life Experiences
Survey; Sarason et al., 1978), and the perceived probability and
persistence of a list of emotional states (Emotion Reactivity and
Perseveration Scale, modeled after the Anxiety Reactivity and
Perseveration Scale; Rudaizky et al., 2012). They also provided
demographic information and information about their horror
movie watching habits (liking and frequency). The constructs
measured in these questionnaires were included as possible mod-
erators of observed effects; analyses using these measures are not
reported in this paper.
DATA RETENTION
To prevent leveraging of condition estimates by extreme, outlying
values, only trials falling less than 4 SD from the within-subjects
mean were retained on a measure-by-measure basis for each
participant. In addition, to prevent leveraging of sample-wide dif-
ferences between conditions, multivariate outliers were excluded
[i.e., participants for whom the estimate of Mahalanobis Distance
across variables within each measure was too large (p < 0.001);
see Fidell and Tabachnick, 2003]. In addition, some participants
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failed to contribute data for all dependent measures due to arti-
facts and/or equipment issues. Due to listwise deletion of missing
data, only participants who provided data in all conditions rele-
vant to particular analyses were included in those analyses. As a
result, degrees of freedom vary across statistical tests.
RESULTS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
Did the pictures produce the expected emotional response?
Our assumption in presenting negative and neutral pictures was
that the negative pictures, more so than neutral pictures, would
elicit negative emotions that peoplemight bemotivated to regulate
by trying to end the situation. This idea would be conﬁrmed by
ﬁnding higher self-reported arousal, corrugator activity, EDA, or
greater deceleration inHRduring the 12-s timeperiod after picture
onset on negative trials relative to the neutral ones.
As expected, a paired samples t-test across all trials (regardless
of whether or not they pressed the button) showed that partici-
pants experienced the negative pictures (M = 4.62, SD = 1.31) as
more intense than the neutral pictures (M = 2.12, SD = 0.77),
t(57) = 16.78, p < 0.001, dz = 2.34, as reﬂected in self-reported
arousal. Negative pictures also led to greater corrugator activity
(M = 1.01, SD = 1.94) than neutral pictures (M = 0.04, SD = 2),
t(57)= 2.43, p= 0.018, dz = 0.49. Therewas a greater deceleration
in HR for negative pictures (M = –3.56, SD = 2.14), compared
with neutral pictures (M = –2.66, SD = 1.96), t(54) = –3.83,
p< .001, dz = –0.44. Finally, EDA activity was greater for negative
pictures (M = 0.07, SD = 0.14) than neutral pictures (M = 0.04,
SD= 0.16), t(57)= 1.93, p= 0.058,dz = 0.19, a difference thatwas
on the border of signiﬁcance. Overall, these results strongly suggest
that the pictures produced the expected emotional response.
Validating the areas of interest
Although proportion of time spent looking at the whole screen
was equivalent in the negative (M = 0.79, SD = 0.17) and neutral
conditions (M = 0.80, SD = 0.16), t(57) = −1.03, p = 0.307,
dz = −0.06, people spent more time looking in negative AOIs
(M = 0.20, SD = 0.06) than neutral AOIs (M = 0.19, SD = 0.05),
t(57) = 3.06, p = 0.003, dz = 0.18. Thus, eye tracking data
conﬁrmed that the pretest-deﬁned AOIs captured the intended
distinction between negative and neutral as appropriate in light of
normative ratings for these two categories of stimuli.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Hypothesis 1. Do people end negative situations more frequently
and faster than neutral situations?
To test our hypotheses that people would attempt to end the situ-
ation (as evidenced by choosing to press the space bar) more often
and faster on negative than neutral trials, paired samples t-tests
were used to compare percentage of space bar presses and RT
for negative versus neutral trials. Contrary to what we expected,
people did not press the space bar more frequently on negative
(M = 44.83%, SD = 27.55) relative to neutral (M = 47.87%,
SD = 29.88) trials, t(57) = −0.78, p = 0.441, dz = −0.12. Simi-
larly, therewas no signiﬁcant difference inRT to press the space bar
on the negative (M = 5.58 s, SD = 2.12) relative to neutral trials
(M = 5.83 s, SD = 1.72), t(50) = −0.87, p = 0.390, dz = −0.13.
Hypothesis 2. Do people end negative situations because they are
upset?
To test our hypotheses that people would report that they tried to
end the situation because they were upset, paired samples t-tests
were used to compare reasons for pressing the button on nega-
tive versus neutral trials. As hypothesized, people chose to press
the space bar more frequently because they were upset by neg-
ative (M = 69.14%, SD = 26.86) relative to neutral pictures
(M = 2.07%, SD = 5.38), t(50) = 18.29, p < 0.001, dz = 3.46.
We also analyzed button pressing frequency in terms of
other reasons people gave for either pressing or not pressing
the button. Perhaps not surprisingly, they chose to press the
space bar more frequently because they were bored by neu-
tral (M = 85.67%, SD = 18.19) relative to negative pictures
(M = 17.26%, SD= 20.54), t(50)= –23.23, p< 0.001,dz =−3.53.
In addition, people chose not to press the space bar more fre-
quently because they were interested in negative (M = 76.26%,
SD = 26.18) relative to neutral pictures (M = 62.2%, SD = 28.13),
t(55) = 4.29, p < 0.001, dz = 0.52. By contrast, they chose not to
press the space bar more frequently because they were indifferent
to the neutral (M = 33.19%, SD = 26.33) relative to the negative
pictures (M = 10.7%, SD = 16.09), t(55) = −6.23, p < 0.001,
dz = −1.03.
Revisiting Hypothesis 1. Could the frequency of ending negative
relative to neutral situations be moderated by arousal?
Summarizing the results of testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 above, we
found that people attempted to end the situation more frequently
when they were upset (negative situation) or bored (neutral situ-
ation), and they elected not to end the situation more frequently
when they were interested (negative situation) or indifferent (neu-
tral situation). However, there was neither a difference in the
percentage of button presses nor in the speed with which the but-
tonwas pressed between the negative andneutral conditions. Since
the reasons participants provided suggested that they were, in fact,
attempting to regulate distress and boredom, we suspected that
comparing negative to neutral picture categories – which encap-
sulate variation in both valence and arousal – may be too broad;
it may be that the behavioral differences of interest are sensitive to
just one of these dimensions.
As such, we examined whether the frequency and speed of
attempts to end the situation varied as a function of arousal within
the negative and neutral categories. To test this, we established
high-arousal and low-arousal subsets based on a median split of
the normative IAPS arousal ratings within the negative and neutral
picture categories. In our stimulus set, the median arousal was
5.79 for the negative pictures and 3.42 for the neutral pictures.
This median split procedure yielded 4 cells each comprised of 15
pictures as follows: high-arousal negative, low-arousal negative,
high-arousal neutral, and low-arousal neutral. Note that because
the arousal cut-off is different for the two negative and neutral
picture categories, we do not treat arousal as a two-level factor
in subsequent analyses. Instead, we use paired t-tests to compare
high-arousal to low-arousal conditions within the negative and
neutral categories.
Within the negative condition, the percentage of space bar
presses was higher for high-arousal (M = 57.69%, SD = 28.62)
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than low-arousal pictures (M = 40.77%, SD = 28.18), t(51)= 4.7,
p< 0.001, dz = 0.6. Within the neutral condition, by contrast, the
percentage of presses was lower for high-arousal (M = 49.38%,
SD = 26.35) than low-arousal pictures (M = 60.41%, SD = 26.05),
t(48) = −6.36, p < 0.001, dz = −0.42. A similar pattern was evi-
dent for response time. Within the negative condition, RT (in
seconds) was faster for high-arousal (M = 5.04, SD = 2.71) than
low-arousal (M = 5.83, SD = 2.17) pictures, t(51) = −3.28,
p = 0.002, dz = −0.32. Within the neutral condition, RT was
slower for high-arousal (M = 6.14, SD = 1.9) than low-arousal
(M = 5.41, SD = 1.77) pictures, t(48) = 3.29, p = 0.002,
dz = 0.4.
These results indicate that participants attempted to end
high-arousal negative and low-arousal neutral situationsmore fre-
quently and more rapidly than they attempted to end low-arousal
negative and high-arousal neutral situations, respectively (see
Figure 2).
Revisiting Hypothesis 2. Could people’s choice to end negative
situations because they are upset be moderated by arousal too?
Consistent with the above pattern for button-pressing behavior,
reasons for pressing the space bar were moderated by arousal
too. Speciﬁcally, within the negative condition, people chose to
press the space bar because they were upset more for high-arousal
(M = 84.84%, SD = 25.75) than low-arousal (M = 53.32%,
SD = 35.59) pictures, t(51) = 6.91, p < 0.001, dz = 1.01. By
contrast, within the neutral condition, people chose to press the
space bar because they were upset to a similar degree for high-
arousal (M = 3.02%, SD = 8.89) and low-arousal (M = 1.29%,
SD = 4.94) pictures, t(48) = 1.302, p = 0.199.
Furthermore, within the negative condition, they chose to
press the space bar less because they were bored by high-arousal
(M = 4.68%, SD = 1.22) than low-arousal (M = 28.64%,
SD = 32.03) pictures, t(51) = −6.06, p < 0.001, dz = −1.06.
Within the neutral condition, they pressed the button less because
they were bored by high-arousal (M = 81.89%, SD = 24.5) than
low-arousal (M = 88.67%, SD = 15.94) pictures, t(48) = −2.418,
p = 0.019, dz = 0.33 (see Figure 3).
Finally, considering the choice to remain in the given situa-
tion, within the negative condition, people chose not to press
the space bar more because they were interested in high-arousal
(M = 81.27%, SD = 30.56) than low-arousal (M = 72.67%,
SD = 29.42) pictures, t(50) = 2.18, p = 0.034, dz = 0.29. In
contrast, they chose not to press the space bar less because they
were indifferent to high-arousal (M = 6.08%, SD = 20.18) than
low-arousal (M = 15.5%, SD = 18.4) pictures, t(50) = −3.32,
p = 0.002, dz = −0.49. This pattern was echoed within the neu-
tral condition, in which people chose not to press the space bar
more because they were interested in high-arousal (M = 70.49%,
SD = 26.57) than low-arousal (M = 55.93%, SD = 31.45) pic-
tures, t(52) = 4.65, p < 0.001, dz = 0.5. They also chose not to
press the space bar less because they were indifferent to the high-
arousal (M = 25.66%, SD = 23.93) than low-arousal (M = 38.2%,
SD = 29.47) pictures, t(52) = −4.21, p < 0.001, dz = 0.47.
Overall, these results suggest that participants attempted to
end high-arousal negative situations more than low-arousal neg-
ative situations when they were upset. Regardless of whether
FIGURE 2 | Mean percentage of trials when the space bar was pressed
is reported separately for negative and neutral pictures, with either
low or high-arousal. People pressed the space bar signiﬁcantly more for
high-arousal negative pictures relative to low-arousal negative pictures.
Within the neutral pictures, people pressed the space bar signiﬁcantly more
often for low-arousal in comparison to high-arousal pictures. Error bars
reﬂect ±1 SEM.
the situation was negative or neutral, participants attempted
to end low-arousal situations more than high-arousal situations
when they were bored, they remained in high-arousal situations
more than low-arousal situations when they were interested, and
they remained in high-arousal situations less than low-arousal
situations when they were indifferent.
Hypothesis 3a. Does ER failure increase negative emotions relative
to ER success?
Since our analyses so far showed that attempts to end the situ-
ation were made most frequently for high-arousal negative and
low-arousal neutral pictures, we focused our test of Hypothesis 3a
on trials in which participants pressed the button to end the situ-
ation in these two cells. Speciﬁcally, we tested whether there was a
pre-to-post-press increase in emotional responding for the success
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FIGURE 3 | Differences in reasons people provide for pressing the
space bar are reported separately for negative and neutral pictures,
with either low or high-arousal. People report being more upset by the
high-arousal negative pictures, and more bored by the low-arousal both
negative and neutral pictures. Error bars reﬂect ±1 SEM.
versus failure conditions. For this purpose, we conducted repeated
measures GLMs with two factors, time (pre-press, post-press) and
manipulated outcome (success, failure) for the physiological mea-
sures and paired samples t-tests for the ratings of arousal (for
which we only had post-press data).
Contrary to Hypothesis 3a, GLM analyses revealed no sig-
niﬁcant interactive effects of time and manipulated outcome
on corrugator activity, HR, EDA, or ratings of arousal for the
high-arousal negative condition. A similar absence of effects
was observed for the low-arousal neutral condition. In that
case, however, there was one signiﬁcant difference. Namely,
ratings of arousal were lower for the success condition than
for the failure condition on low-arousal neutral trials. These
results are summarized in Table 1. Overall, they suggest that
ER failure did not increase negative emotions relative to ER
success.
Hypothesis 3b. Do people use attentional deployment to compensate
for ER failure?
The absence of outcome differences in emotional responding
might suggest that participants were compensating for the failure
of the space bar press to end the situation by using one or more
alternative ER strategies. In this study, we addressed this possibility
by focusing speciﬁcally on attentional deployment in the high-
arousal negative and low-arousal neutral conditions. Contrary to
Hypothesis 3b, GLM analyses assessing effects of time (pre-press,
post-press) and manipulated outcome (success, failure) showed
that looking time in theAOIs decreased frompre-to-post space bar
press for both high-arousal negative F(1,46) = 307.41, p < 0.001
and low-arousal neutral picture F(1,46) = 357.70, p < 0.001, and
it did so to the same extent in the success and failure conditions.
These results are summarized in Table 1. Overall, they suggest that
participants did not use attentional deployment to compensate for
ER failure.
Secondary analyses. Is there a reduction in frequency of button
press across time?
The absence of an impact of manipulated regulatory outcome
(success versus failure) on both emotional responding and com-
pensatory attentional deployment led us to consider the possibility
that participantswere insufﬁciently invested in the task and, in par-
ticular, progressively less motivated to press the space bar as they
learned (implicitly or explicitly) that the button press had only
a 50:50 chance of having the intended effect. We thus examined
whether the percentage of button presses decreased from the ﬁrst
to the second block of the picture task. Indeed, a paired samples
t-test revealed a modest but signiﬁcant drop in the frequency of
button presses in block 2 (M = 44.15%, SD = 24.73) relative to
block 1 (M = 48.32%, SD = 26.25), t(56) = 2.55, p = 0.014,
dz = 0.16. However, this drop was found only for low-arousal
negative pictures ( block 1 M = 41.19%, SD = 32.03; block 2
M = 33.98, SD = 32.03), t(56) = 2.36, p = 0.022, dz = 0.23,
and for high-arousal neutral pictures (block 1 M = 45.69%,
SD = 32.64; block 2 M = 38.64, SD = 32.17), t(56) = 2.14,
p= 0.037, dz = 0.22. There was no signifcant drop in button press-
ing for high-arousal negative and low-arousal neutral pictures,
both p’s> 0.05, the two conditions of central importance to testing
Hypothesis 3.
DISCUSSION
Our results show that participants attempted to end the situation
more often for high-arousal than low-arousal negative pictures
and more often for low-arousal than high-arousal neutral pic-
tures. They reported doing so because they were upset or bored,
respectively. Partially supporting our ﬁrst two hypotheses, these
observations suggest that people engage in situation-targeted ER
strategies in order to alter their emotional experience when given
an explicit opportunity to do so. Contrary to our ﬁrst hypoth-
esis, however, participants did not generally try to end negative
situations more often or faster than neutral situations. Rather,
differences in the use of situation-targeted ER strategies between
negative and neutral situations were only evident in ways that
depended on arousal level, as described above. Contrary to our
third hypothesis, we found little to no evidence that failed attempts
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Table 1 | Mean (and Standard Deviations) for the dependent measures as a function of manipulated outcome and time in high-arousal negative
and low-arousal neutral conditions.
Statistics Failure Success
Pre Post Pre Post
High-arousal negative
Corrugator activity F (1,43) = 1.5, p = 0.227 –0.14 (12.49) 0.32 (11.81) 1.92 (3.97) 1.38 (6.03)
Heart rate F (1,41) = 3.08, p = 0.087 –2.68 (3.20) –3.28 (3.49) –3.03 (3.55) –3.04 (3.90)
Electrodermal activity F (1,43) = 0.40, p = 0.531 0.05 (0.26) 0.14 (0.29) 0.00 (0.20) 0.14 (0.29)
Ratings of arousal t (46) = 1.12, p = 0.267 – 5.75 (1.57) – 5.91 (1.62)
Looking time in the AOIs F (1,46) = 0.16, p = 0.690 0.26 (0.11) 0.01 (0.03) 0.27 (0.13) 0.01 (0.03)
Low-arousal neutral
Corrugator activity F (1,44) = 1.31, p = 0.259 –0.66 (2.97) –0.32 (1.78) 0.06 (1.14) –0.23 (1.48)
Heart rate F (1,41) = 1.58, p = 0.215 –3.28 (3.43) –3.18 (2.89) –3.09 (3.55) –2.29 (3.75)
Electrodermal activity F (1,44) = 1.4, p = 0.244 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.13) 0.07 (0.24) 0.05 (0.15)
Ratings of arousal t (44) = −2.29, p = 0.027 – 1.9 (0.93) – 1.62 (0.66)
Looking time in the AOIs F (1,44) = 0.57, p = 0.454 0.27 (0.10) 0.01 (0.01) 0.26 (0.12) 0.01 (0.01)
The F statistics reported above are for the time (pre-press, post-press) × manipulated outcome (failure, success) interaction.
to end the situation increased emotional responding or prompted
compensatory ER using attentional deployment.
In light of the lack of evidence for increased emotional respond-
ing or compensatory ER, we wondered if participant motivation
ﬂagged as the task wore on. Indeed, consistent with this possibility,
we conﬁrmed that button pressing waned in the second half of the
task. However, this reduction in frequency of button presses was
signiﬁcant only for low-arousal negative and high-arousal neu-
tral trials, the conditions for which people were not pressing the
space bar frequently to begin with. Presumably this is because
low-arousal negative and high-arousal neutral trials were insuf-
ﬁciently boring to motivate an attempt to end the situation or
sufﬁciently interesting to motivate staying in the situation, respec-
tively. This might suggest that when people are strongly motivated
(as in the high-arousal negative and low-arousal neutral condi-
tions), the frequency with which they attempt to regulate their
emotions is immune to lack of control over the likely outcome of
regulation.
LINKS TO EXISTING LITERATURE
Gross et al. (2006) reported ﬁnding little evidence of two situation-
targeted ER strategies, situation selection and situation modiﬁ-
cation, in everyday life. In that work, the authors used semi-
structured interviews in which respondents were prompted to
think of a time in the past couple of weeks when they tried alter-
ing their emotions. Since it might not always be clear to people
that they are avoiding certain situations in order to regulate their
emotions, the incidence of situation-targeted ER strategies may
actually be higher than reported. In the present study, button
pressing behavior indexed the frequency and speed of ER in which
the goal was to end the situation to alter negative emotion. We
found that in high-arousal negative and low-arousal neutral situa-
tions, people used a situation-targeted ER strategy roughly 60% of
the time.We are hard-pressed to deﬁnitively categorize the button
press as situation selection or situationmodiﬁcation. If one thinks
of the button press as selecting a new, unemotional situation, situ-
ation selection may be the correct label. On the other hand, if one
thinks of the button press as choosing to change the existing emo-
tional situation, situation modiﬁcation may be the correct label.
Eitherway, these results give the impression that situation-targeted
strategies may occur with greater frequency than was evident in
interviews.
Previous research has shown that people choose different ER
strategies based on the intensity of negatively valenced situations.
Namely, in low-intensity negative situations, people choose reap-
praisal over distraction,while in high-intensity negative situations,
people choose distraction over reappraisal (Sheppes et al., 2011).
Echoing Sheppes et al. (2011), our results indicate that attempts
to end emotion-eliciting situations also depend on intensity. We
found that people pressed the space bar more frequently for high-
arousal negative and low-arousal neutral pictures, and they did
so because they were upset by the negative pictures and bored
by the neutral pictures. Furthermore, people pressed the space
bar faster on high-arousal negative trials, and low-arousal neu-
tral trials. These results thus extend the idea that choice of ER
strategy depends on situation intensity from a context in which
participants chose between attentional deployment (distraction)
and cognitive change (reappraisal; Sheppes et al., 2011) to a con-
text in which a situation-targeted ER strategy was readily available.
Revisiting an earlier point, had Gross et al.’s (2006) ER interview
asked participants to consider their use of ER strategies to alter
intense emotions speciﬁcally, situation-targeted ER strategies (sit-
uation selection, situation modiﬁcation) may have been endorsed
more frequently.
Our results also help shed light on the links between valence,
arousal, and viewing time, as demostrated in Lang et al. (1993).
These authors showed that viewing time was longest for pictures
that were ranked most pleasant and most unpleasant relative to
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neutral. This quadratic relationship disappeared, however, when
controlling for arousal. This suggests that the viewing time effect
was explained by arousal. Indeed, in that study, people looked at
high-arousal pictures longer than low-arousal pictures, an effect
that remained even when they controlled for valence. Our results
underscore the importance of arousal in explaining viewing time
but add an important caveat. Namely, the effect of arousal on view-
ing time (as indexed by RTs to press the button) can be moderated
by valence. In the present study, people spent less time viewing
high-arousal negative and low-arousal neutral contents relative to
low-arousal negative and high-arousal neutral contents, respec-
tively. According to our results, it seems that there is a “tipping
point” on the arousal scale at which a certain level of arousal gets
to be “too much” or “too little,” which prompts people to decide
to try to end the situation.
THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
The SOC-ER framework suggests that we select and optimize
ER strategies and, when our emotion-regulatory maneuvers do
not successfully alter our emotions as intended, we can com-
pensate by employing alternative strategies (Urry and Gross,
2010; Opitz et al., 2012). We found little evidence that failed
attempts to end emotion-eliciting situations increased emotional
responding relative to successful attempts. This might suggest
that participants compensated for this ER failure by selecting an
alternative ER strategy, which would be consistent with SOC-
ER. However, we found no evidence to suggest that they did so
using attentional deployment. If compensation occurred, it may
have been by way of alternative ER strategies that we did not
assess.
It is also possible that compensation in the wake of ER failure
(having high-arousal negative and low-arousal neutral pictures
remain on screen despite an avowed desire for them to go away)
did not work the way we expected. It may be that, even when
the key press successfully removed the picture from the screen,
there was a tendency to maintain a mental representation of that
content (e.g., via visual imagery and/or internal verbal behavior,
both of which would constitute a form of rumination). If true,
the success and failure conditions, though distinct in terms of
objective input, were indistinct in terms of mental representation;
in effect, compensation was occurring, as predicted by SOC-ER,
but in the “wrong”direction. That is, instead of using alternate ER
strategies to reduce negative emotion (attentional deployment)
in the failure condition, subjects may have been using alternate
ER strategies that increase negative emotion (rumination) in the
success condition. We had no measure of rumination during the
task thus this remains speculative.
Suri et al. (2013) argue that attentional deployment and CR are
“most unambiguously cognitive in nature” (p. 198), unlike situa-
tion selection and situation modiﬁcation, which are behavioral in
nature. We wholeheartedly agree that attentional deployment and
CR are “more cognitive” than situation-targeted strategies. Nev-
ertheless, we would like to add that the latter still are cognitive to
some degree. Speciﬁcally, ending an upsetting or boring situation
by leaving (or pressing the button in this study) emerges as the
result of a decision making process. Thus, to the extent that deci-
sion making constitutes a cognitive process, cognition is actually
present in all ﬁve of the ER families described in Gross’s (1998)
process model of ER.
In this study, we obtained evidence that people attempted to
regulate boredom when viewing low-arousal neutral pictures. In
addition, it was only for low-arousal neutral pictures that we saw
any evidence that ER failure resulted in a stronger emotional
response compared to ER success. Speciﬁcally, people felt more
aroused when the pictures stayed on the screen compared to when
they went away. It is worth noting here that investigators, includ-
ing us, often say they do not pair the ER instructions with neutral
pictures because there is no emotion to regulate (e.g., Urry, 2010).
The present results suggest this is not strictly true, at least not
for the least arousing neutral stimuli. For those stimuli, boredom
is prominent and, according to our button press results, this is an
emotional state that people aremotivated to regulate. Future stud-
ies that examine regulation of boredom are warranted. Boredom
is, afterall, an emotional state that may lead to troublesome behav-
ior (Sommers and Vodanovich, 2000; Dahlen et al., 2004; Wegner
et al., 2008). As such, learning whether people can regulate bore-
dom could have clinical utility. In these efforts, it would be worth
determining whether particular forms of ER are better suited than
others for regulating boredom in low-arousal situations.
Avoidance behavior, particularly experiential avoidance,
deﬁned as a person’s unwillingness to experience negative emo-
tions, sensations, feelings, and thoughts, and desire to change
the form or frequency of situations giving rise to those experi-
ences, is an example of ER through situation selection (Hayes
et al., 1996). Hayes et al. (1996) argue that unhealthy avoidance of
emotions can be implicated in many behavioral disorders such as
substance abuse and dependence, obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD), panic disorder with agoraphobia, and borderline person-
ality disorder, also proposing that suicide might be the ultimate
avoidance strategy. Thus, studying which situations people choose
to approach, avoid, or modify, how frequently,in which contexts,
and the cognitive, emotional, and social consequences of doing
so can inform clinical practice and help in the development of
appropriate therapy. The present study is a step toward meeting
those goals.
It is important to note here that all families of ER, situation-
targeted forms included, can be helpful and/or harmful depending
on one’s goals and the context at hand. Always selecting situa-
tions to avoid negative emotions is unlikely to be helpful in the
long run. Flexible deployment of ER processes appropriate for the
present circumstances – e.g., sometimes approaching, sometimes
avoiding emotion-eliciting situations – is apt to be key to adaptive
functioning (e.g., Bonanno, 2013).
LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH
Our approach to the questions of interest in this work has the ben-
eﬁt of contributing a novel and simple laboratory task to assess
the use of situation-targeted ER strategies in a way that bypasses
self-report methods. This contribution is signiﬁcant because,
although situation-targeted strategies are of central importance to
the process model (Gross, 1998), studies that examine situation-
targeted strategies are sorely lacking in the current literature (Webb
et al., 2012). That being said, our approach also has several key
limitations, three of which we discuss below.
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One important limitation of this design is the lack of a suc-
cess/failure manipulation in the no-press condition. This would
have allowed us to determine to what extent agency, i.e., the per-
ception that one is in control, plays a role in responses to the
button press. In addition, to enhance the sense of agency, it would
be useful to change the distribution of failed to successful attempts
to end the situation. In the present work, there was a roughly even
distribution such that the button press had the intended effect 50%
of the time. An uneven distribution, in which the button press has
the intended effect most (but not all) of the time would perhaps
better mirror emotion regulatory efforts in everyday life, in which
we often succeed in selecting or altering the situation as intended.
Methodologically, thismight alsomake participantsmore invested
in the task.
Our study demonstated the importance of arousal in the deci-
sion to end emotion-eliciting situations. These results tie in with
Lang et al. (1993), who showed that arousal ratings were correlated
with viewing time. The present study was limited in this regard,
however, because it was not possible to use a universal cut-off to
deﬁne high- and low-arousal categories in our set of negative and
neutral pictures. Had we used a universal cut-off to deﬁne high
and low arousal, we would have had too few stimuli in the low-
arousal negative and high-arousal neutral categories to achieve
reliable estimates. This is because valence and arousal were not
orthogonal; the negative category was deﬁned a priori as unpleas-
ant and high-arousal and the neutral category as neither pleasant
nor unpleasant and low-arousal. Thus, in future studies, it would
be useful to select stimuli using a single criterion of arousal to
establish four comparable sets of stimuli in equal numbers: high-
arousal negative, high-arousal neutral, low-arousal negative, and
low-arousal neutral pictures. This approach would have enabled
us to treat arousal and valence as orthogonal factors in GLM
analyses.
Finally, this study was limited in its assessment of alternative
ER strategies that participants may have used to compensate in
the ER failure condition. Although attentional deployment was a
well-considered candidate for compensatory ER, it was the only
alternative we assessed. As noted previously, it is possible that
compensation occurred via other means, e.g., rumination. Other
alternatives are worth considering too. It might be useful, for
example, to assess CR as another potential strategy of choice for
compensation. CR is one of the most widely studied ER strate-
gies, and people report using it frequently in everyday life. Gross
et al. (2006), for example, found CR in 33% of emotional episodes
reported by their participants. Additionally, there is evidence that
attentional depoloyment is used together with other ER strate-
gies, and differently at that – people tend to look away from
emotional aspects of the picture more if they also used suppres-
sion, relative to reappraisal (Bebko et al., 2011). Using a variant of
the picture task described here, we could ask participants at the
end of each trial to indicate the strategies they used to alter their
emotions and then compare the failure and success conditions.
Importantly, in light of our earlier speculation about rumination,
such efforts should measure ER strategies that would reduce emo-
tional responding (of relevance in the failure condition) as well
as ER strategies that might increase it (of relevance in the success
condition).
ADDITIONAL DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This work suggests a number of promising broad directions for
future research, three of which we consider here.
First, one important question to ask is how the effects we
observed in this study vary in people who are younger or
older than those studied herein. On the younger side of the
coin, we know that adolescents’ emotional life is quite different
than adults’: adolescents generally report feeling more emotion
than adults in their everyday life, particularly negative emo-
tion (Larson and Lampman-Petraitis, 1989; Larson et al., 2002;
Weinstein et al., 2007; Riediger et al., 2009). This effect might par-
tially be explained by use of different ER strategies and/or a
different set of resources available for ER at different points in
the life span (Opitz et al., 2012). On the older side of the coin,
there is evidence suggesting that older adults experience more
positive (Stawski et al., 2008) and less negative affect (Charles
et al., 2001) than younger adults, which could be at least partially
explained by their ER abilities (Urry and Gross, 2010). Further-
more, unlike older adults, younger adults sometimes actually feel
better by deploying their attention to the negative aspects of the
situation (Isaacowitz and Noh, 2011). Older adults are also more
successful than younger adults in using attentional deployment
and positive reappraisal (Lohani and Isaacowitz, 2013). In light
of these ﬁndings, it seems likely that the frequency and success of
situation-targeted ER strategies, and the contexts in which people
use them vary across the life span. As such, there may also be dif-
ferences in the ways in which people of different ages compensate
for ER failure.
Second, although we are conﬁdent that this study is well suited
to address our primary goals, our study sample is fairly homoge-
nous (college undergraduates, mostly women, mostly Caucasian).
As such, there may be interesting gender and/or cultural differ-
ences in situation-targeted ER that we will be unable to capture
ideally in this work. For instance, evidence suggests that men use
suppression more than women (Gross and John, 2003). In addi-
tion, research shows that European Americans use suppression
less than Americans with an ethnic minority status (Gross and
John, 2003). In other work, Matsumoto et al. (2008) found that
cultures that value social order tend to suppress emotion more
often and to show positively correlated reappraisal and suppres-
sion use. In contrast, cultures that value affective autonomy more
than social order suppress emotion less often and show negatively
correlated reappraisal and suppression use. There is also evidence
suggesting that sociocultural contexts have a powerful inﬂuence
on antecedent-focused automatic ER, which is deﬁned as changes
to one’s emotions without consciously deciding to do so, with-
out attending to this regulatory process, and without engaging
in deliberate control (Mauss et al., 2008). Future work should
drawonbroad community populations to obtain culturally diverse
samples with even gender distributions.
Finally, in the laboratory task developed in present research,
we explicitly instructed people to end the situation if they wanted.
In addition, by asking about their reasons for ending the situ-
ation, we explicitly cued them to consider that they might do
so if they became upset or bored. In everyday contexts, such
explicit cues regarding opportunities and reasons for regulating
one’s emotions are rare. In that case, what we observed in this task
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maybe anoverestimate of the use of situation-targeted strategies in
daily life. Thus, another line of research should examine situation-
targeted strategies in situations with greater external validity. One
way to go about it would be to expose subjects to situations in
the lab that are closer to real-world experiences, e.g., assessing
how frequently they choose whether they want to have a poten-
tially unpleasant/anxiety-provoking task or personal interaction,
and under what circumstances they make this situation-targeted
decision. Another alternative is to use methods in the real world,
such as experience sampling to gauge situation-targeted ER in
the context of very distressing and very boring life events. Such
efforts have promise in yielding even better estimates of the use of
situation-targeted ER strategies in daily life.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we sought to determine how frequently and for what
reasons people would use readily available situation-targeted
strategies to regulate their emotions. We also sought to test the
notion of compensatory ER as proposed in the SOC-ER frame-
work. To accomplish these goals, we developed a novel laboratory
task in which participants decided whether or not to end negative
and neutral situations and indicated the reasons for their choices.
We manipulated the outcome of these decisions such that some
situations ended successfully as intended while other situations
failed to end. Our results suggest that people use situation-targeted
strategies to regulate their emotions, especially in high-arousal
negative situations when they are upset and in low-arousal neu-
tral situations when they are bored. We observed no evidence that
people experience more negative emotions when their attempt at
situation-targeted ER failed to have the intended effect. We also
observed no evidence that people compensate using attentional
deployment in this scenario. There are a number of important
directions for future research in this domain. Should these ﬁndings
replicate, they have important theoretical and clinical implica-
tions. Overall, the current study provides an experimental test of
aspects of the SOC-ER framework and contributes a novel and
simple laboratory task to assess the use of situation-targeted ER
strategies.
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